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and Riccati Equation Approaches
Bingchang Wang, Member, IEEE, and Huanshui Zhang, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract
This paper studies social optima and Nash games for mean field linear quadratic control systems,
where subsystems are coupled via dynamics and individual costs. For the social control problem, we first
obtain a set of forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDE) from variational analysis,
and construct a feedback-type control by decoupling the FBSDE. By using solutions of two Riccati
equations, we design a set of decentralized control laws, which is further proved to be asymptotically
social optimal. Two equivalent conditions are given for uniform stabilization of the systems in different
cases. For the game problem, we first design a set of decentralized control from variational analysis, and
then show that such set of decentralized control constitute an asymptotic Nash equilibrium by exploiting
the stabilizing solution of a nonsymmetric Riccati equation.
It is verified that the proposed decentralized control laws are equivalent to the feedback strategies
of mean field control in previous works. This may illustrate the relationship between open-loop and
feedback solutions of mean field control (games).
Index Terms
Mean field game, variational analysis, social optimality, forward-backward stochastic differential
equation, Riccati equation
I. INTRODUCTION
Mean field games have drawn increasing attention in many fields including system control,
applied mathematics and economics [7], [8], [12]. The mean field game involves a very large
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population of small interacting players with the feature that while the influence of each one
is negligible, the impact of the overall population is significant. By combining mean field
approximations and individual’s best response, the dimensionality difficulty is overcome. Mean
field games and control have found wide applications, including smart grids [27], [10], finance,
economics [13], [9], [32], and social sciences [5], etc.
By now, mean field games have been intensively studied in the LQ (linear-quadratic) frame-
work [18], [19], [25], [33], [6], [29]. Huang et al. developed the Nash certainty equivalence
(NCE) based on the fixed-point method and designed an ǫ-Nash equilibrium for mean field LQ
games with discount costs by the NCE approach [18], [19]. The NCE approach was then applied
to the cases with long run average costs [25] and with Markov jump parameters [33], respectively.
Bensoussan et al. employed the adjoint equation approach and the fixed-point theorem to obtain
a sufficient condition for the unique existence of the equilibrium strategy over a finite horizon
[6]. For other aspects of mean field games, readers are referred to [21], [23], [39], [11] for
nonlinear mean field games, [37] for oblivious equilibrium in dynamic games, [17], [34], [35]
for mean field games with major players, [16], [29] for robust mean field games.
Besides noncooperative games, social optima in mean field models have also attracted much
interest. The social optimum control refers to that all the players cooperate to optimize the
common social cost—the sum of individual costs, which is usually regarded as a type of team
decision problem [30], [14]. Huang et al. considered social optima in mean field LQ control,
and provided an asymptotic team-optimal solution [20]. Wang and Zhang [36] investigated a
mean field social optimal problem where the Markov jump parameter appears as a common
source of randomness. For further literature, see [22] for social optima in mixed games, [3] for
team-optimal control with finite population and partial information.
Most previous results on mean field games and control were given by virtue of the fixed-point
analysis. However, the fixed-point method is sometimes conservative, particularly for general
systems. In this paper, we break away from the fixed-point method and solve the problem
by tackling forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDE). In recent years, some
substantial progress for the optimal LQ control has been made by solving the FBSDE. See [40],
[42], [43], [31] for details.
This paper investigates social optima and Nash games for linear quadratic mean field systems,
where subsystems (agents) are coupled via dynamics and individual costs. For the finite-horizon
social control problem, we first obtain a set of forward-backward stochastic differential equations
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(FBSDE) by examining the variation of the social cost, and give a centralized feedback-type
control laws by decoupling the FBSDE. With mean field approximations, we design a set of
decentralized control laws, which is further shown to have asymptotic social optimality. For
the infinite-horizon case, we design a set of decentralized control laws by using solutions of
two Riccati equations, which is shown to be asymptotically social optimal. Some equivalent
conditions are further given for uniform stabilization of the multiagent systems when the state
weight Q is semi-positive definite or only symmetric. For the problem of mean field games, we
first design a set of decentralized control by variational analysis, whose control gain satisfies a
nonsymmetric Riccati equation. With the help of the stabilizing solution of the nonsymmetric
Riccati equation, we show that the set of decentralized control laws is an asymptotic Nash equi-
librium. It is verified that the proposed decentralized control laws are equivalent representation
of the feedback strategies in previous works of mean field control and games. Finally, some
numerical examples are given to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed control laws.
The main contributions of the paper are summarized as follows.
(i) For the social control problem, we first obtain necessary and sufficient existence conditions
of finite-horizon centralized optimal control by variational analysis, and then design a feedback-
type decentralized control by tackling FBSDE with mean field approximations.
(ii) In the case Q ≥ 0, the necessary and sufficient conditions are given for uniform stabiliza-
tion of the systems with the help of the system’s observability and detectability.
(iii) In the case that Q is only symmetric, the necessary and sufficient conditions are given
for uniform stabilization of the systems using the Hamiltonian matrices.
(iv) For the game problem, we show that the decentralized control laws constitute an ε-Nash
equilibrium by exploiting the stabilizing solution of a nonsymmetric Riccati equation.
(v) It is under nonconservative assumptions that we obtain the asymptotically optimal decen-
tralized control, and such control laws are shown to be equivalent to the feedback strategies
given by the fixed-point method in previous works [19], [20].
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section II, the socially optimal control problem
is investigated. We first construct asymptotically optimal decentralized control laws by tackling
FBSDE for the finite-horizon case, then design asymptotically optimal control for the infinite-
horizon case and further give two equivalent conditions of uniform stabilization for different
cases. In Section III, we design a decentralized ε-Nash equilibrium for the finite-horizon and
infinite-horizon cases, respectively. The proposed decentralized control laws are compared with
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the feedback strategies of previous works in Section IV. In Section V, some numerical examples
are given to show the effectiveness of the proposed control laws. Section VI concludes the paper.
The following notation will be used throughout this paper. ‖ · ‖ denotes the Euclidean vector
norm or matrix spectral norm. For a vector z and a matrix Q, ‖z‖2Q = zTQz, and Q > 0
(Q ≥ 0) means that Q is positive definite (semi-positive definite). For two vectors x, y, 〈x, y〉 =
xTy. C([0, T ],Rn) is the space of all Rn-valued continuous functions defined on [0, T ], and
Cρ/2([0,∞),Rn) is a subspace of C([0,∞),Rn) which is given by {f |
∫∞
0
e−ρt‖f(t)‖2dt <∞}.
L2F (0, T ;R
k) is the space of all F -adapted Rk-valued processes x(·) such that E ∫ T
0
‖x(t)‖dt <
∞. For two sequences {an, n = 0, 1, · · · } and {bn, n = 0, 1, · · · }, an = O(bn) denotes that
lim supn→∞ |an/bn| ≤ C, and an = o(bn) denotes lim supn→∞ |an/bn| = 0. For convenience of
presentation, we use C,C1, C2, · · · to denote generic positive constants, which may vary from
place to place.
II. MEAN FIELD LQ SOCIAL CONTROL
Consider a large population systems with N agents. Agent i evolves by the following stochastic
differential equation:
dxi(t) = [Axi(t) +Bui(t) +Gx
(N)(t) + f(t)]dt+ σ(t)dWi(t), 1 ≤ i ≤ N, (1)
where xi ∈ Rn and ui ∈ Rr are the state and input of the ith agent. x(N)(t) = 1N
∑N
j=1 xj(t),
f, σ ∈ Cρ/2([0,∞),Rn). {Wi(t), 1 ≤ i ≤ N} are a sequence of independent 1-dimensional
Brownian motions on a complete filtered probability space (Ω,F , {Ft}0≤t≤T ,P). The cost func-
tion of agent i is given by
Ji(u) = E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
{∥∥xi(t)− Γx(N)(t)− η∥∥2Q + ‖ui(t)‖2R
}
dt, (2)
where Q, R are symmetric matrices with appropriate dimensions, and R > 0. Denote u =
{u1, . . . , ui, . . . , uN}. The decentralized control set is given by
Ud,i =
{
ui
∣∣ ui(t) is adapted to σ(xi(s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t), E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt‖ui(t)‖2dt <∞
}
.
For comparison, define the centralized control sets as
Uc,i =
{
ui
∣∣ ui(t) is adapted to Ft, E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt‖ui(t)‖2dt <∞
}
,
and Uc =
{
(u1, · · · , uN)
∣∣ ui is adapted to Uc,i}, where Ft = σ{⋃Ni=1F it} and F it = σ(xi(0),
Wi(s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t), i = 1, · · · , N .
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In this section, we mainly study the following problem.
(PS). Seek a set of decentralized control laws to optimize social cost for the system (1)-(2),
i.e., infui∈Ud,i Jsoc, where
Jsoc =
N∑
i=1
Ji(u).
Assume
A1) xi(0), i = 1, ..., N are mutually independent and have the same mathematical expectation.
xi(0) = xi0, Exi(0) = x¯0, i = 1, · · · , N . There exists a constant C0 (independent of N) such
that max1≤i≤N E‖xi(0)‖2 < C0. Furthermore, {xi(0), i = 1, ..., N} and {Wi, i = 1, ..., N} are
independent of each other.
A. The finite-horizon problem
For the convenience of design, we first consider the following finite-horizon problem.
(P1) inf
u∈L2
Ft
(0,T ;Rr)
JFsoc(u),
where JFsoc(u) =
∑N
i=1 J
F
i (u) and
JFi (u) = E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
{∥∥xi(t)− Γx(N)(t)− η∥∥2Q + ‖ui(t)‖2R
}
dt. (3)
We first give an equivalent condition for the convexity of Problem (P1).
Proposition 2.1: Problem (P1) is convex in u if and only if for any ui ∈ L2Ft(0, T ;Rr),
i = 1, · · · , N ,
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
{∥∥yi − Γy(N)∥∥2Q + ‖ui‖2R
}
dt ≥ 0,
where y(N) =
∑N
j=1 yj/N and yi satisfies
dyi = [Ayi +Gy
(N) +Bui]dt, yi(0) = 0, i = 1, 2, · · · , N. (4)
Proof. Let xi and x´i be the state processes of agent i with the control v and v´, respectively.
Take any λ1 ∈ [0, 1] and let λ2 = 1− λ1. Then
λ1J
F
soc(v) + λ2J
F
soc(v´)− JFsoc(λ1v + λ2v´)
=λ1λ2E
∫ T
0
{‖xi − x´i − Γ(xN − x´N )‖2Q + ‖ui − u´i‖2R} dt.
Denote u = v − v´, and yi = xi − x´i. Thus, yi satisfies (4). By the definition of the convexity,
the lemma follows. 
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By examining the variation of JFsoc, we obtain the necessary and sufficient conditions for the
existence of centralized optimal control of (P1).
Theorem 2.1: Suppose R > 0. Then (P1) has a set of optimal control laws if and only
if Problem (P1) is convex in u and the following equation system admits a set of solutions
(xi, pi, β
j
i , i, j = 1, · · · , N):

dxi =
(
Axi − BR−1BT pi +Gx(N) + f
)
dt+ σdWi,
dpi =−
[
(A− ρI)Tpi +GTp(N)
]
dt− (Qxi −QΓx(N) − η¯)dt+
N∑
j=1
βji dWj,
xi(0) = xi0, pi(T ) = 0, i = 1, · · · , N,
(5)
where QΓ
∆
= ΓTQ + QΓ − ΓTQΓ, η¯ ∆= Qη − ΓTQη, p(N) = 1
N
∑N
i=1 pi, and furthermore the
optimal control is given by uˇi = −R−1BTpi.
Proof. Suppose that uˇi = −R−1BTpi, where pi, i = 1, · · · , N are a set of solutions to the
equation system
dpi = αidt+ β
i
idWi +
∑
j 6=i
βji dWj , pi(T ) = 0, i = 1, · · · , N, (6)
where αi, i = 1, · · · , N are to be determined. Denote by xˇi the state of agent i under the control
uˇi. For any ui ∈ L2Ft(0, T ;Rr) and θ ∈ R, let uθi = uˇi + θui. Denote by xθi the solution of the
following perturbed state equation
dxθi =
(
Axθi +B(uˇi + θui) + f +
G
N
N∑
i=1
xθi
)
dt+ σdWi,
xθi (0) = xi0, i = 1, 2, · · · , N.
Let yi = (x
θ
i − xˇi)/θ. It can be verified that yi satisfies (4). Then by Itoˆ’s formula, for any
i = 1, · · · , N ,
0 = E[〈e−ρT pi(T ), yi(T )〉 − 〈pi(0), yi(0)〉]
= E
∫ T
0
[〈αi, yi〉+ 〈pi, (A− ρI)yi +Gy(N) +Bui〉]dt,
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which implies
0 =
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
[〈αi, yi〉+ 〈pi, (A− ρI)yi +Gy(N) +Bui〉]dt
=
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
[
〈αi + (A− ρI)Tpi, yi〉+ 〈pi, Bui〉
]
dt
+ E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
〈 N∑
i=1
pi,
G
N
N∑
i=1
yi
〉]
dt
=
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
[〈αi + (A− ρI)Tpi +GTp(N), yi〉+ 〈BTpi, ui〉]dt. (7)
From (3), we have
JˇFsoc(uˇ+ θu)− JˇFsoc(uˇ) = 2θI1 + θ2I2 (8)
where uˇ = (uˇ1, · · · , uˇN), and
I1
∆
=
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
[〈
Q
(
xˇi − (Γxˇ(N) + η)
)
, yi − Γy(N)
〉
+ 〈Ruˇi, ui〉
]
dt,
I2
∆
=
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
[∥∥yi − Γy(N)∥∥2Q + ‖ui‖2R]dt.
Note that
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
〈
Q
(
xˇi − (Γxˇ(N) + η)
)
,Γy(N)
〉
dt
=E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
〈
ΓTQ
N∑
i=1
(
xˇi − (Γxˇ(N) + η)
)
,
1
N
N∑
j=1
yj
〉
dt
=
N∑
j=1
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
〈ΓTQ
N
N∑
i=1
(
xˇi − (Γxˇ(N) + η)
)
, yj
〉
dt
=
N∑
j=1
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
〈
ΓTQ
(
(I − Γ)xˇ(N) − η), yj〉dt.
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From (7), one can obtain that
I1 =E
N∑
i=1
∫ T
0
e−ρt
[〈
Q
(
xˇi − (Γxˇ(N) + η)
)
, yi − Γy(N)
〉
dt+ 〈Ruˇi +BT pi, ui〉
]
dt
+
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
[〈αi + (A− ρI)T pi +GTp(N), yi〉
=
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
〈
Ruˇi +B
Tpi, ui
〉
dt
+
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
〈
Q
(
xˇi − (Γxˇ(N) + η)
)− ΓTQ((I − Γ)xˇ(N) − η)
+ αi + (A− ρI)Tpi +GTp(N), yi
〉
dt. (9)
From (8), uˇ is a minimizer to Problem (P1) if and only if I2 ≥ 0 and I1 = 0. By Proposition
2.1, I2 ≥ 0 if and only if (P1) is convex. I1 = 0 is equivalent to
αi =−
[
(A− ρI)Tpi − ΓTQ
(
(I − Γ)xˇ(N) − η)+Q(xˇi − (Γxˇ(N) + η)) +GTp(N)],
uˇi =−R−1BTpi.
Thus, we have the following optimality system:

dxˇi = (Axˇi − BR−1BT pˇi +Gxˇ(N) + f)dt+ σdWi,
dpˇi = − [(A− ρI)T pˇi +GT pˇ(N) +Qxˇi −QΓxˇ(N) + η¯)]t+
N∑
j=1
βji dWj,
xˇi(0) = xi0, pˇi(T ) = 0, i = 1, · · · , N,
(10)
such that uˇi = −R−1BT pˇi. This implies that the equation systems (5) admits a solution
(xˇi, pˇi, βˇ
j
i , i, j = 1, · · · , N).
On other hand, if the equation system (5) admits a solution (xˇi, pˇi, βˇ
j
i , i, j = 1, · · · , N). Let
uˇi = −R−1BT pˇi. If (P1) is convex, then uˇ is a minimizer to Problem (P1).

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It follows from (5) that

dx(N) =
[
(A +G)x(N) − BR−1BTp(N) + f
]
dt +
1
N
N∑
i=1
σdWi,
dp(N) =−
[
(A+G− ρI)Tp(N) − (I − Γ)TQ(I − Γ)x(N) + η¯
]
dt+
1
N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
βji dWj,
x(N)(0) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
xi0, p
(N)(T ) = 0.
(11)
Let pi = Pxi +Kx
(N) + s. Then by (5), (11) and Itoˆ’s formula,
dpi =P
[(
Axi − BR−1BT (Pxi +Kx(N) + s) +Gx(N) + f
)
dt+ σdWi
]
+ (P˙ xi + s˙+ K˙x
(N))dt
+K
{[
(A+G)x(N) − BR−1BT ((P +K)x(N) + s) + f]dt+ 1
N
N∑
i=1
σdWi
}
= − [(A− ρI)T (Pxi +Kx(N) + s) +GT ((P +K)x(N) + s) +Qxi −QΓx(N) − η¯]dt
+
N∑
j=1
βji dWj.
This implies that βii =
1
N
Kσ + Pσ, βji =
1
N
Kσ, j 6= i,
ρP = P˙ + ATP + PA− PBR−1BTP +Q, P (T ) = 0, (12)
ρK = K˙ + (A+G)TK +K(A+G)− PBR−1BTK −KBR−1BTP
+GTP + PG−KBR−1BTK −QΓ, K(T ) = 0, (13)
ρs = s˙+ [A +G−BR−1BT (P +K)]T s+ (P +K)f − η¯, s(T ) = 0. (14)
Then uˇi = −R−1BT (Pxi +Kx(N) + s).
Theorem 2.2: Assume that A1) holds and Q ≥ 0. Then Problem (P1) has an optimal control
uˇi = −R−1BT (Pxi +Kx(N) + s),
where P,K and s are determined by (12)-(14).
Proof. Denote Π = P +K. Then from (13) and (14), Π satisfies
ρΠ = Π˙ + (A+G)TΠ+ Π(A +G)−ΠBR−1BTΠ+ Qˆ, Π(T ) = 0, (15)
where Qˆ
∆
= (I − Γ)TQ(I − Γ). Note that Q ≥ 0 and R > 0. By [2], [41], (12) and (15) admit
unique solutions P ≥ 0 and Π ≥ 0, respectively, which implies that (13) and (14) have unique
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solutions K and s, respectively. Then by [26], [42], the FBSDE (5) admits a unique solution.
By Theorem 2.1, Problem (P1) has an optimal control given by uˇi = −R−1BT (Pxi+Kx(N)+s),
where P,K and s are determined by (12)-(14). 
As an approximation to x(N) in (11), we obtain
dx¯
dt
= (A+G)x¯− BR−1BT (Πx¯+ s) + f, x¯(0) = x¯0. (16)
Then, by Theorem 2.2, the decentralized control law for agent i may be taken as
uˆi(t) =−R−1BT (P xˆi(t) +Kx¯(t) + s(t)), 0 ≤ t ≤ T, i = 1, · · · , N, (17)
where P,K, and s are determined by (12)-(14), and x¯ and xˆi satisfy (16) and
dxˆi =
[
(A−BR−1BTP )xˆi − BR−1BT [Kx¯+ s] +Gxˆ(N) + f
]
dt+ σdWi. (18)
Remark 2.1: In previous works [20], [36], the mean field term x(N) in cost functions
(dynamics) is first substituted by a deterministic function x¯. By solving an optimal tracking
problem subject to consistency requirements, a fixed-point equation is obtained. The decentralized
control is constructed by handling the fixed-point equation. Here, we firstly obtain the centralized
open-loop solution by variational analysis. By tackling the coupled FBSDEs combined with mean
field approximations, the decentralized control laws are designed. Note that in this case s and x¯
are fully decoupled and no fixed-point equation is needed.
Theorem 2.3: Let A1) hold and Q ≥ 0. The set of decentralized control laws {uˆ1, · · · , uˆN}
given by (17) has asymptotic social optimality, i.e.,∣∣∣ 1
N
JFsoc(uˆ)−
1
N
inf
u∈L2
Ft
(0,T ;Rnr)
JFsoc(u)
∣∣∣ = O( 1√
N
).
Proof. See Appendix A. 
B. The infinite-horizon problem
Based on the analysis in Section II-A, we may design the following decentralized control laws
for Problem (PS):
uˆi(t) = − R−1BT [P xˆi(t) + (Π− P )x¯(t) + s(t)], t ≥ 0, i = 1, · · · , N, (19)
where P and Π are determined by
ρP =ATP + PA− PBR−1BTP +Q, (20)
ρΠ =(A+G)TΠ+ Π(A+G)− ΠBR−1BTΠ+ Qˆ, (21)
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and s, x¯ ∈ Cρ/2([0,∞),Rn) are determined by
ρs = s˙+ [A+G− BR−1BTΠ]T s+Πf − η¯, (22)
dx¯
dt
= (A+G)x¯− BR−1BT (Πx¯+ s) + f, x¯(0) = x¯0. (23)
Here the existence conditions of P,Π, s and x¯ need to be investigated further.
We introduce some assumptions:
A2) The system (A− ρ
2
I, B) is stabilizable, and (A+G− ρ
2
I, B) is stabilizable.
A3) Q ≥ 0, (A− ρ
2
I,
√
Q) is observable, and (A+G− ρ
2
I,
√
Q(I − Γ)) is observable.
Assumptions A2) and A3) are basic in the study of the LQ optimal control problem. We will
show that under some conditions, A2) is also necessary for uniform stabilization of multiagent
systems. In many cases, A3) may be weakened to the following assumption.
A3′) Q ≥ 0, (A− ρ
2
I,
√
Q) is detectable, and (A+G− ρ
2
I,
√
Q(I − Γ)) is detectable.
Lemma 2.1: Under A2)-A3), (20) and (21) admit unique solutions P > 0,Π > 0, respectively,
and (22)-(23) admits a set of unique solutions s, x¯ ∈ Cρ/2([0,∞),Rn).
Proof. From A2)-A3) and [2], (20) and (21) admit unique solutions P > 0,Π > 0 such that
A−BR−1BTP − ρ
2
I and A+G−BR−1BTΠ− ρ
2
I are Hurwitz, respectively. From an argument
in [34, Appendix A], we obtain s ∈ Cρ/2([0,∞),Rn) if and only if
s(0) =
∫ ∞
0
e(A+G−BR
−1BTΠ−ρI)τ (Πf − η¯)dτ.
Under this initial condition, we have
s(t) =
∫ ∞
t
e−(A+G−BR
−1BTΠ−ρI)(t−τ)(Πf − η¯)dτ.
It is straightforward that x¯ ∈ Cρ/2([0,∞),Rn). 
We further introduce the following assumption.
A4) A¯ +G− ρ
2
I is Hurwitz, where A¯
∆
= A−BR−1BTP .
Lemma 2.2: Let A1)-A4) hold. Then for (PS),
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt‖xˆ(N)(t)− x¯(t)‖2dt = O( 1
N
). (24)
Proof. See Appendix B. 
It is shown that the decentralized control laws (17) uniformly stabilize the systems (1) .
Theorem 2.4: Let A1)-A4) hold. Then for any N ,
N∑
i=1
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(‖xˆi(t)‖2 + ‖uˆi(t)‖2) dt <∞. (25)
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Proof. See Appendix B. 
We now give two equivalent conditions for uniform stabilization of multiagent systems.
Theorem 2.5: Let A3) hold. Then for (PS) the following statements are equivalent:
(i) For any initial condition (xˆ1(0), · · · , xˆN(0)) satisfying A1),
N∑
i=1
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(‖xˆi(t)‖2 + ‖uˆi(t)‖2) dt <∞. (26)
(ii) (20) and (21) admit unique solutions P > 0,Π > 0, respectively, and A¯ + G − ρ
2
I is
Hurwitz.
(iii) A2) and A4) hold.
Proof. See the Appendix C. 
For the case G = 0, we have a simplified version of Theorem 2.5.
Corollary 2.1: Assume that A3) holds and G = 0. Then for (PS) the following statements
are equivalent:
(i) For any (xˆ1(0), · · · , xˆN (0)) satisfying A1),
N∑
i=1
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(‖xˆi(t)‖2 + ‖uˆi(t)‖2) dt <∞.
(ii) (20) and (21) admit unique solutions P > 0,Π > 0, respectively.
(iii) A2) holds.
When A3) is weakened to A3′), we have the following equivalent conditions of uniform
stabilization of the systems.
Theorem 2.6: Let A3′) hold. Then for (PS) the following statements are equivalent:
(i) For any initial condition (xˆ1(0), · · · , xˆN(0)) satisfying A1),
N∑
i=1
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(‖xˆi(t)‖2 + ‖uˆi(t)‖2) dt <∞.
(ii) (20) and (21) admit unique solutions P ≥ 0,Π ≥ 0, respectively, and A¯ + G − ρ
2
I is
Hurwitz.
(iii) A2) and A4) hold.
Proof. See the Appendix C. 
Remark 2.2: In [43], some similar results were given for the stabilization of mean field
systems. However, only the limiting problem was considered in their work and the mean field
term in dynamics and costs is Ex(t) instead of x(N). Here we study large-population multiagent
systems and the number of agents is large but not infinite. The errors of mean field approximations
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are further analyzed. To obtain asymptotic optimality, an additional assumption A4) is needed
later.
For the more general case that Q are only symmetric, we have the following equivalent
conditions for uniform stabilization of multiagent systems.
Denote
M1 =

 A− ρ2I BR−1BT
Q −AT + ρ
2
I

 , M2 =

 A+G− ρ2I BR−1BT
Qˆ −(A +G)T + ρ
2
I

 .
Theorem 2.7: Assume that both M1 and M2 have no eigenvalues on the imaginary axis. Then
for (PS) the following statements are equivalent:
(i) For any (x1(0), · · · , xN (0)) satisfying A1),
N∑
i=1
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(‖xˆi(t)‖2 + ‖uˆi(t)‖2) dt <∞.
(ii) (20) and (21) admit ρ-stabilizing solutions1, respectively, and A¯ +G− ρ
2
I is Hurwitz.
(iii) A2) and A4) hold.
Remark 2.3: M1 and M2 are Hamiltonian matrices. The Hamiltonian matrix plays a signif-
icant role in studying general algebraic Riccati equations. See more details of the property of
Hamiltonian matrices in [1], [28].
To show Theorem 2.7, we need two lemmas. The first lemma is a result from [28, Theorem
6].
Lemma 2.3: Equations (20) and (21) admit ρ-stabilizing solutions if and only if A2) holds
and both M1 and M2 have no eigenvalues on the imaginary axis.
Lemma 2.4: Let A1) hold. Assume that (20) and (21) admit ρ-stabilizing solutions, respec-
tively, and A¯+G− ρ
2
I is Hurwitz. Then
N∑
i=1
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(‖xˆi(t)‖2 + ‖uˆi(t)‖2) dt <∞.
Proof. From the definition of ρ-stabilizing solutions, A − BR−1BTP − ρ
2
I and A + G −
BR−1BTΠ− ρ
2
I are Hurwitz. By the argument in the proof of Theorem 2.4, the lemma follows.

1For a Riccati equation (20), P is called a ρ-stabilizing solution if P satisfies (20) and all the eigenvalues of A−BR−1BTP
are in left half-plane.
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The Proof of Theorem 2.7. By using Lemmas 2.3 and 2.4 together with a similar argument in
the proof of Theorem 2.4, the Theorem follows. 
Example 2.1: Consider a scalar system with A = a, B = b, G = g, Q = q, Γ = γ, R = r > 0.
Then
M1 =

 a− ρ/2 b2/r
q −a + ρ/2

 , M2 =

 a+ g − ρ/2 b2/r
q(1− γ)2 −(a + g − ρ/2)

 .
By direct computations, neither M1 nor M2 has eigenvalues in imaginary axis if and only if
(a− ρ
2
)2 +
b2
r
q > 0, (27)
(a+ g − ρ
2
)2 +
b2
r
(1− γ)2q > 0. (28)
Note that if q > 0 (or a − ρ/2 < 0, q = 0), i.e., (a− ρ/2,√q) is observable (detectable), then
(27) holds, and if (1 − γ)2q > 0 (a + g − ρ/2 < 0, q = 0), i.e., (a + g − ρ/2,√q(1 − γ)) is
observable (detectable), then (28) holds.
For this model, the Riccati equation (20) is written as
b2
r
p2 − (2a− ρ)p− q = 0. (29)
Let ∆ = 4[(a−ρ/2)2+b2q/r]. If (27) holds then ∆ > 0, which implies (29) admits two solutions.
If q > 0 then (29) has a unique positive solution such that a − b2p/r − ρ/2 = −√∆/2 < 0.
If q = 0 and a − ρ/2 < 0 then (29) has a unique non-negative solution p = 0 such that
a− b2p/r − ρ/2 = a− ρ/2 < 0.
Assume that (27) and (28) hold. By Theorem 2.7, the system is uniformly stable if and only
if (a − ρ/2, b) is stabilizable (i.e., b 6= 0 or a − ρ/2 < 0), and a − b2p/r − ρ/2 + g < 0. Note
that a− b2p/r − ρ/2 < 0. When g ≤ 0, we have a− b2p/r − ρ/2 + g < 0.
Example 2.2: We further consider the model in Example 2.1 for the case that a + g = ρ/2
and γ = 1 (i.e., (28) does not hold). In this case, the Riccati equation (21) admits a unique
solution Π = 0. (22) becomes ρs = s˙+ ρ
2
s and has a unique solution s = 0 in Cρ/2([0,∞),R).
Thus, x¯ satisfies
dx¯
dt
=
ρ
2
x¯+ f. (30)
Assume that f is a constant. Then (30) does not admit a solution in Cρ/2([0,∞),R) unless
x¯(0) = −2f/ρ.
We are in a position to state the asymptotic optimality of the decentralized control.
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Theorem 2.8: Let A1)-A4) hold. For Problem (PS), the set of decentralized control laws
{uˆ1, · · · , uˆN} given by (19) has asymptotic social optimality, i.e.,∣∣∣ 1
N
Jsoc(uˆ)− 1
N
inf
u∈Uc
Jsoc(u)
∣∣∣ = O( 1√
N
).
Proof. We first prove that for u ∈ Uc, Jsoc(u) <∞ implies that
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt(‖xi‖2 + ‖ui‖2)dt <∞, (31)
for all i = 1, · · · , N . From Jsoc(u) <∞, we have E
∫∞
0
e−ρt‖ui‖2dt <∞ and
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
∥∥xi − Γx(N)∥∥2Qdt <∞, (32)
which further implies that
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
∥∥(I − Γ)x(N)∥∥2
Q
≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
∥∥xi − Γx(N)∥∥2Qdt <∞. (33)
By (1) we have
dx(N)(t) =
[
(A+G)x(N)(t) +Bu(N)(t) + f(t)
]
dt+
1
N
N∑
i=1
σ(t)dWi(t),
which leads to for any r ∈ [0, 1],
x(N)(t) = e(A+G)rx(N)(t− r) +
∫ t
t−r
e(A+G)(t−τ)[Bu(N)(τ) + f(τ)]dτ
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
∫ t
t−r
e(A+G)(t−τ)σ(τ)dWi(τ).
(34)
By Jsoc(u) <∞ and basic SDE estimates, we can find a constant C such that
E
∫ ∞
r
e−ρt
∥∥∥
∫ t
t−r
e(A+G)(t−τ)Bu(N)(τ)dτ
∥∥∥2dt ≤ C.
From (33) and (34) we obtain
E
∫ ∞
r
e−ρt[x(N)(t− r)]T e(A+G)T r(I − Γ)TQ(I − Γ) · e(A+G)rx(N)(t− r)dt ≤ C,
which together with A3) implies that
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt‖x(N)(t)‖2dt <∞. (35)
This and (32) lead to
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt‖xi(t)‖2Qdt <∞. (36)
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By (1), we have
xi(t) = e
Arxi(t− r) +
∫ t
t−r
eA(t−τ)[Bui(τ) + f(τ) +Gx
(N)(τ)]dτ
+
∫ t
t−r
eA(t−τ)σ(τ)dWi(τ).
(37)
It follows from (35) that
E
∫ ∞
r
e−ρt
∥∥∥
∫ t
t−r
eA(t−τ)Gx(N)(τ)dτ
∥∥∥2dt
≤E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρτ‖Gx(N)(τ)‖2
∫ r
0
∥∥∥e(A− ρ2 I)v
∥∥∥2dvdτ ≤ C.
From (36) and (37), we obtain that
E
∫ ∞
r
e−ρtxTi (t− r)eA
T rQeArxi(t− r)dt ≤ C.
This together with A3) implies that
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt‖xi(t)‖2dt <∞,
which gives (31). By Theorem 2.4,
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(‖x˜i‖2 + ‖u˜i‖2)dt <∞.
By a similar argument to the proof of Theorem 2.3 combined with Lemma 2.2, the conclusion
follows. 
If A3) is replaced by A3′), the decentralized control (19) still has asymptotic social optimality.
Corollary 2.2: Assume that A1)-A2), A3′), A4) hold. The set of decentralized control laws
given by (19) is asymptotically socially optimal.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we simply assume A+G = diag{A1,A2}, where A1− (ρ/2)I
is Hurwitz, and −(A2 − (ρ/2)I) is Hurwitz (If necessary, we may apply a nonsingular linear
transformation as in the proof of Theorem 2.6). Write x(N) = [zT1 , z
T
2 ] and Qˆ
1/2 = [S1, S2] such
that ∥∥(I − Γ)x(N)∥∥2
Q
= ‖S1z1 + S2z2‖2,
and (A2− (ρ/2)I, S2) is observable which is due to the detectability of (A+G− (ρ/2)I, Qˆ1/2).
By the proof of Theorem 2.4 or [17], E
∫∞
0
e−ρt‖u(N)‖2dt < ∞ implies E ∫∞
0
e−ρt‖z1‖2dt <
∞, which together with (33) gives E ∫∞
0
e−ρt‖S2z2‖2dt < ∞. This and the observability of
(A2 − (ρ/2)I, S2) leads to E
∫∞
0
e−ρt‖z2‖2dt < ∞. Thus, E
∫∞
0
e−ρt‖x(N)‖2dt < ∞. The other
parts of the proof are similar to that of Theorem 2.8. 
April 17, 2019 DRAFT
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES 17
III. MEAN FIELD LQ GAMES
In this section, we investigate the game problem for LQ mean field systems.
(PG). Seek a set of decentralized control laws to minimize individual cost for each agent in
the system (1)-(2).
A. The finite-horizon problem
We first consider the finite-horizon problem. Suppose that x¯ ∈ C([0, T ],Rn) is given for
approximation of x(N). Replacing x(N) in (1) and (3) by x¯, we have the following auxiliary
optimal control problem.
(P2) inf
ui∈L2
Fi
t
(0,T ;Rr)
J¯Fi (ui),
where
dx`i(t) = [Ax`i(t) +Bui(t) +Gx¯(t) + f(t)]dt+ σ(t)dWi(t), 1 ≤ i ≤ N,
J¯Fi (ui) = E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
{
‖x`i − Γx¯− η‖2Q + ‖ui‖2R
}
dt.
By examining the variation of J¯Fi , we obtain the unique optimal control of (P2).
Theorem 3.1: Assume Q ≥ 0, R > 0. Then the FBSDE

dx`i =
[
Ax`i −BR−1BTpi +Gx¯+ f
]
dt+ σdWi,
dpi = −
[
(AT − ρI)pi +Qx`i −QΓx¯−Qη
]
dt+ qidWi,
x`i(0) = xi0, pi(T ) = 0, i = 1, 2, · · · , N
(38)
admits a unique solution (x`i, pi, qi), and the optimal control uˆi = −R−1BT pi.
Proof. Since Q ≥ 0 and R > 0, then by [41], (P2) is uniformly convex, and hence admits a
unique optimal control. By a similar argument with Theorem 2.1, the conclusion follows. 
It follows from (38) that


dx`(N) =
[
Ax`(N) −BR−1BTp(N) +Gx¯+ f]dt+ 1
N
N∑
i=1
σdWi,
dp(N) =−
[
(A− ρI)Tp(N) +Qx`(N) −QΓx¯−Qη
]
dt +
1
N
N∑
i=1
qidWi,
x`(N)(0) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
xi0, p
(N)(T ) = 0.
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Replacing x`(N) by x¯, we have

dx¯ =
[
(A+G)x¯− BR−1BT p¯+ f]dt, x¯(0) = x0,
dp¯ = −[(A− ρI)T p¯+Qx¯−QΓx¯−Qη]dt, p¯(T ) = 0. (39)
Let p¯ = P¯ x¯+ sˆ. By Itoˆ’s formula, we obtain
P¯
{
(A+G)x¯−BR−1BT (P¯ x¯+ sˆ) + f} dt+ ( ˙¯P x¯+ ˙ˆs)dt
= dp¯ = −[(A− ρI)T (P¯ x¯+ sˆ) +Qx¯−QΓx¯−Qη]dt.
This implies
ρP¯ = ˙¯P + AT P¯ + P¯ (A+G)− P¯BR−1BT P¯ +Q−QΓ, P¯ (T ) = 0, (40)
ρsˆ = ˙ˆs+ (A− BR−1BT P¯ )T sˆ+ P¯ f −Qη, sˆ(T ) = 0. (41)
Denote p˜i = pi − p¯, and x˜i = x`i − x¯. Then by (38) and (39) we have

dx˜i =
[
Ax˜i − BR−1BT p˜i
]
dt+ σdWi, x˜i(0) = xi0 − x¯0,
dp˜i = −
[
(A− ρI)T p˜i +Qx˜i
]
dt+ qidWi, p˜i(T ) = 0.
Let p˜i = P x˜i. By Itoˆ’s formula,
dp˜i = −
[
(A− ρI)T p˜i +Qx˜i
]
dt+ qidWi
= P˙ x˜idt+ P [(Ax˜i − BR−1BTP x˜i)dt+ σdWi],
which implies that qi = Pσ, and
ρP = P˙ + ATP + PA− PBR−1BTP +Q. (42)
Assume
A5) Equation (40) admits a solution in C([0, T ],Rn).
By the local Lipschitz-continuous property of the quadratic function, (40) can admit a unique
local solution in a small time duration [T0, T ]. It may be referred to [1] for some sufficient
conditions of the existence of the solution in [0, T ]. We now provide a necessary and sufficient
condition to guarantee the global solvability of (40).
Proposition 3.1: (40) admits a solution in C([0, T ],Rn) if and only if for any t ∈ [0, T ],
det{(0, I)eAt(0, I)T} > 0,
where
A =

 A+G −BR−12 BT
QΓ−Q −(A− ρI)T

 .
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Proof. Sufficiency is given by [26, Theorem 4.3, p.48]. Necessity is implied from Proposition
4.2 and Theorem 3.2 of [26, Chapter 2]. 
Let
uˆi = −R−1BT [P xˆi + (P¯ − P )x¯+ sˆ], (43)
where P, P¯ and sˆ are determined by (42), (40) and (41), respectively, and x¯ and xˆi satisfy
dx¯ =
[
Ax¯− BR−1BT (P¯ x¯+ sˆ) +Gx¯+ f]dt, x¯(0) = x0, (44)
dxˆi =
[
(A−BR−1BTP )xˆi − BR−1BT [(P¯ − P )x¯+ sˆ]
+Gxˆ(N) + f
]
dt+ σdWi, xˆi(0) = xi0. (45)
Denote u−i = (u1, · · · , ui−1, ui+1, · · · , uN).
Theorem 3.2: Let A1), A5) hold and Q ≥ 0. The set of decentralized strategies {uˆ1, · · · , uˆN}
given by (43) is an ε-Nash equilibrium, i.e.,
inf
ui∈L2Ft (0,T ;Rr)
JFi (ui, uˆ−i) ≥ JFi (uˆi, uˆ−i)− ε, (46)
where ε = (1/
√
N).
Proof. See the Appendix D. 
B. The infinite-horizon problem
For simplicity, we consider the case G = 0.
Based on the analysis in Section III-A, we may design the following decentralized control for
(PG):
uˆi(t) =− R−1BT [P xˆi(t) + (P¯ − P )x¯(t) + sˆ(t)], t ≥ 0, i = 1, · · · , N, (47)
where P and P¯ are determined by
ρP =ATP + PA− PBR−1BTP +Q, (48)
ρP¯ =AT P¯ + P¯A− P¯BR−1BT P¯ +Q(I − Γ), (49)
respectively, and sˆ, x¯ ∈ Cρ/2([0,∞),Rn) are determined by
ρsˆ = ˙ˆs+ [A− BR−1BT P¯ ]T sˆ+ P¯ f − η, (50)
dx¯
dt
=Ax¯− BR−1BT (P¯ x¯+ sˆ) + f, x¯(0) = x¯0. (51)
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and xˆi satisfies
dxˆi =
[
(A−BR−1BTP )xˆi − BR−1BT [(P¯ − P )x¯+ sˆ]
+Gxˆ(N) + f
]
dt+ σdWi, xˆi(0) = xi0. (52)
Here the existence conditions of P, P¯ , s and x¯ need to be investigated further.
We introduce the following assumptions.
A6) (A− ρ
2
I, B) is stabilizable, Q ≥ 0 and (A− ρ
2
I,
√
Q) is detectable.
A7) (49) admits a stabilizing solution.
Lemma 3.1: Assume thatM3 has n stable eigenvalues (with negative real parts) and n unstable
eigenvalues, where
M3 =

 A− ρ2I BR−1BT
Q(I − Γ) −AT + ρ
2
I

 .
Suppose that
M3

 L1
L2

 =

 L1
L2

H11, (53)
where H11 is Hurwitz and L1 is invertible. Then A7) holds.
Proof. Let P¯ = −L2L−11 . It follows from (53) that
M3

 −I
P¯

 =

 −I
P¯

L1H11L−11 . (54)
By pre-multiplying by [P¯ I] on both sides, we obtain
[P¯ I]M3

 −I
P¯

 = 0,
which leads to (49). By (54), we have A − BR−1BT P¯ − ρ
2
I = L1H11L
−1
1 is Hurwitz. It is
straightforward that s, x¯ ∈ Cρ/2([0,∞),Rn). 
Remark 3.1: The above lemma provides a convenient method to compute the stabilizing solu-
tions of algebraic Riccati equations. Assume there exists an invertible matrix V =

 V11 V12
V21 V22


such that V −1M3V =

 H11 H12
0 H22

 , where V11 is invertible, and H11,−H22 are Hurwitz. Then
V21V
−1
11 is the stabilizing solution of (49). V comprises 2n independent vectors, which are called
Schur vectors [24].
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Lemma 3.2: Assume that A1), A6), A7) hold. Then (50)-(51) admit a set of unique solutions
s, x¯ ∈ Cρ/2([0,∞),Rn), and
N∑
i=1
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(‖xˆi(t)‖2 + ‖uˆi(t)‖2) dt <∞.
Proof. By a similar argument in the proof of Theorem 2.6, the lemma follows. 
Theorem 3.3: Let A1), A6), A7) hold. For Problem (PG), the set of decentralized strategies
{uˆ1, · · · , uˆN} given by (47) is an ε-Nash equilibrium, i.e.,
inf
ui∈Uc,i
Ji(ui, uˆ−i) ≥ Ji(uˆi, uˆ−i)− ε,
where ε = (1/
√
N).
Proof. See Appendix D. 
IV. COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT SOLUTIONS
In this section, we compare the proposed decentralized control laws with the feedback decen-
tralized strategies in previous works [19], [20].
We first introduce a definition from [4].
Definition 4.1: For a control problem with an admissible control set U , a control law u ∈ U
is said to be a representation of another control u∗ ∈ U if
(i) they both generate the same unique state trajectory, and
(ii) they both have the same open-loop value on this trajectory.
For Problem (PS), let f = 0, and G = 0. In [20, Theorem 4.3], the decentralized control laws
are given by
u˘i = −R−1BT (Pxi + s¯), i = 1, · · · , N, (55)
where P is the semi-positive definite solution of (48), and s¯ = K¯x† + φ. Here K¯ satisfies
ρK¯ = K¯A¯+ A¯T K¯ − K¯BR−1BT K¯T −QΓ,
and x†, φ ∈ Cρ/2([0,∞),Rn) are determined by
dx¯†
dt
= A¯x¯† − BR−1BT (K¯x¯† + φ), x¯†(0) = x¯0,
dφ
dt
= − [A− BR−1BT (P + K¯)− ρI]φ+ η¯,
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in which A¯ = A−BR−1BTP . By comparing this with (21)-(23), one can obtain that K¯ = Π−P ,
x¯ = x¯† and φ = s. From the above discussion, we have the equivalence of the two sets of
decentralized control laws.
Proposition 4.1: The set of decentralized control laws {uˆ1, · · · , uˆN} in (19) is a representation
of {u˘1, · · · , u˘N} given by (55).
For Problem (PG), let f = 0, and G = 0. In [19], the decentralized strategies are given by
u∗i = −R−1BT (Pxi + s∗), i = 1, · · · , N, (56)
where P is the positive definite solution of (20), s∗ is determined by the fixed-point equation

ρs∗ =
ds∗
dt
+ A¯T s∗ −QΓ(x¯∗ + η),
dx¯∗
dt
= A¯x¯∗ −BR−1BT s∗, x¯∗(0) = x¯0.
(57)
We now show the equivalence of the decentralized open-loop and feedback solutions to mean
field games.
Proposition 4.2: The set of decentralized control laws {uˆ1, · · · , uˆN} in (47) is a representation
of {u∗1, · · · , u∗N} given by (56).
Proof. Let s∗ = K∗x¯∗ + ψ. From (57), we have
ds∗
dt
=K∗
dx¯∗
dt
+
dψ
dt
=K∗
[
A¯x¯∗ −BR−1BT (K∗x¯∗ + ψ)]+ dψ
dt
=(ρI − A¯)T (K∗x¯∗ + ψ) +Q(Γx¯∗ + η),
which gives
ρK∗ = K∗A¯ + A¯TK∗ −K∗BR−1BTK∗ −QΓ,
ρψ =
dψ
dt
+ [A¯− BR−1BTK∗]Tψ −Qη.
By comparing this with (48)-(50), one can obtain K = P¯ − P , and ψ = sˆ. Thus, we have
u∗i ≡ uˆi, i = 1, · · · , N, which implies that {u∗1, · · · , u∗N} is a representation of {uˆ1, · · · , uˆN} in
(47). 
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V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section, some numerical examples are given to illustrate the effectiveness of the
proposed decentralized control laws.
We first consider a scalar system with 50 agents in Problem (PS). Take B = Q = R = 1, G =
−0.2, f(t) = 1, σ(t) = 0.1, ρ = 0.6,Γ = −0.2, η = 5 in (1)-(2). The initial states of 50 agents
are taken independently from a normal distribution N(5, 0.5). Then, under the control law (19),
the state trajectories of agents for the cases with A = 0.2 and A = 1 are shown in Figs. 1
and 2, respectively. After the transient phase, the states of agents behave similarly and achieve
agreement roughly.
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time
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5.5
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6.5
7
st
at
es
Fig. 1: Curves of 50 agents with A = 0.2.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
time
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
6
6.5
st
at
es
Fig. 2: Curves of 50 agents with A = 1.
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Next, we simulate the scalar case of Problem (PG), where the parameters are the same as
above, except G = 0. After the control laws (47) are applied, the state trajectories of 50 agents
with A = 0.2 and A = 1 are shown in Figs. 3 and 4, respectively.
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Fig. 3: Curves of 50 agents with A = 0.2.
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7
st
at
es
Fig. 4: Curves of 50 agents with A = 1.
For the case A = 1 and G = 0, the trajectories of x¯ and xˆ(N) in Problems (PS) and (PG) are
shown in Fig. 5. It can be seen that x¯ and xˆ(N) coincide well, which illustrate the consistency
of mean field approximations. Clearly, the state average of agents has significantly lower value
in Problem (PS) than in (PG).
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
time
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
xˆ(N ) in (PS)
x¯ in (PS)
xˆ(N ) in (PG)
x¯ in (PG)
Fig. 5: Curves of x¯ and xˆ(N) in (PS) and (PG).
Finally, we consider the 2-dimensional case of Problem (PS). Take parameters as follows:
A =

 0.1 0
−1 0.2

, B =

 1 0
0 1

, G =

 −0.5 0
0 −0.3

, B =

 1
1

, Q =

 1 0
0 1

,
Γ =

 1 0
1 1

, R =

 1 0
0 1

, η =

 0
0.5

, f = [1 1]T and σ = [0.5 0.5]T . Denote xˆi(t) =
[xˆ1i (t) xˆ
2
i (t)]
T . Both of xˆ1i (0) and xˆ
2
i (0) are taken independently from a normal distribution
N(5, 0.5). Under the control laws (19), the trajectories of xˆ1i and xˆ
2
i , i = 1, · · · , N are shown
in Figs. 6 and 7, respectively.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
time
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
xˆ
1 i
,i
=
1,
2,
·
·
·
,5
0.
Fig. 6: Curves of xˆ1i , i = 1, · · · , 50.
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
time
1
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xˆ
2 i
,i
=
1,
2,
·
·
·
,5
0.
Fig. 7: Curves of xˆ2i , i = 1, · · · , 50.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we have considered uniform stabilization and asymptotic optimality for mean
field LQ multiagent systems. For social control and Nash game problems, we design the de-
centralized open-loop control laws by the variational analysis, respectively, which are further
shown to be asymptotically optimal. Two equivalent conditions are further given for uniform
stabilization of the systems in different cases. Finally, we show such decentralized control laws
are equivalent to the feedback strategies in previous works.
An interesting generalization is to consider mean field LQ control systems with partial mea-
surements by using variational analysis. Also, the variational analysis may be applied to general
nonlinear model to construct decentralized control laws for social control and Nash games.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 2.3
To prove Theorem 2.3, we need a lemma.
Lemma A.1: Let A1) hold and Q ≥ 0. Under the control (17), we have
max
0≤t≤T
E‖xˆ(N)(t)− x¯(t)‖2 = O( 1
N
). (A.1)
Proof. It follows by (18) that
dxˆ(N) =
[
(A¯ +G)xˆ(N) − BR−1BT (Kx¯+ s) + f]dt+ 1
N
N∑
i=1
σdWi.
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From this and (16), we have
d(xˆ(N) − x¯) = (A¯+G)(xˆ(N) − x¯)dt+ 1
N
N∑
i=1
σdWi,
which leads to
xˆ(N)(t)− x¯(t) = e(A¯+G)t[xˆ(N)(0)− x¯(0)] + 1
N
N∑
i=1
∫ t
0
e(A¯+G)(t−τ)σdWi(τ). (A.2)
By A1), one can obtain
E
∥∥xˆ(N)(t)− x¯(t)∥∥2
≤ ∥∥2e(A¯+G)t∥∥2{E∥∥xˆ(N)(0)− x¯(0)∥∥2 + 1
N
∫ t
0
tr
[
σT e−(A¯
T+GT+A¯+G)τσ
]
dτ
}
≤ 2
N
∥∥e(A¯+G)t∥∥2{ max
1≤i≤N
E‖xˆi0‖2 +
∫ T
0
tr
[
σT e−(A¯
T+GT+A¯+G)τσ
]
dτ
}
,
(A.3)
which completes the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 2.3. We first prove that for u ∈ Uc, JFsoc(u) <∞ implies that E
∫ T
0
e−ρt(‖xi‖2+
‖ui‖2)dt < ∞, for all i = 1, · · · , N . By JFsoc(u) < ∞, we have E
∫ T
0
e−ρt‖ui‖2dt < ∞. This
leads to
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt‖u(N)‖2dt ≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt‖ui‖2dt <∞,
where u(N) = 1
N
∑N
i=1 ui. By (1),
dx(N)(t) =
[
(A+G)x(N)(t) +Bu(N)(t) + f(t)
]
dt+
1
N
N∑
i=1
σ(t)dWi(t),
which with A1) implies that
max
0≤t≤T
E‖x(N)(t)‖2 ≤ C.
Note that
xi(t) = e
Atxi0 +
∫ t
0
eA(t−τ)[Gx(N)(τ) +Bui(τ) + f(τ)]dτ.
We have
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt‖xi‖2dt ≤ C
(
E‖xi0‖2 + max
0≤t≤T
E‖x(N)(t)‖2 + max
0≤t≤T
E‖ui(t)‖2
)
<∞. (A.4)
By (16) and (18), we obtain that
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
(‖xˆi‖2 + ‖uˆi‖2 + ‖x¯‖2)dt <∞. (A.5)
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Let x˜i = xi − xˆi, u˜i = ui − uˆi and x˜(N) = 1N
∑N
i=1 x˜i. Then by (1) and (18),
dx˜i = (Ax˜i +Gx˜
(N) +Bu˜i)dt, x˜i(0) = 0. (A.6)
From (3), we have
JFsoc(u) =
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
[∥∥xˆi − Γxˆ(N) − η + x˜i − Γx˜(N)∥∥2Q +
∥∥uˆi + u˜i∥∥2R
]
dt
=
N∑
i=1
(JFi (uˆ) + J˜
F
i (u˜) + Ii),
(A.7)
where
J˜Fi (u˜)
∆
= E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
[‖x˜i − Γx˜(N)‖2Q + ‖u˜i‖2R]dt,
Ii = 2E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
[(
xˆi − Γxˆ(N) − η
)T
Q
(
x˜i − Γx˜(N)
)
+ uˆTi Ru˜i
]
dt.
By (A4), J˜Fi (u˜) ≥ 0. We now prove 1N
∑N
i=1 Ii = O(
1√
N
).
N∑
i=1
Ii
=
N∑
i=1
2E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
{
x˜Ti
[
Q(xˆi − Γxˆ(N) − η)− ΓTQ((I − Γ)xˆ(N) − η)
]
+
N∑
i=1
uˆTi Ru˜i
}
dt
=
N∑
i=1
2E
∫ T
0
e−ρt
{
x˜Ti
[
Q(xˆi − Γx¯− η)− ΓTQ((I − Γ)x¯− η)
]
+
N∑
i=1
uˆTi Ru˜i
}
dt
+
N∑
i=1
2E
∫ T
0
e−ρt(xˆ(N) − x¯)TQΓx˜idt.
(A.8)
By (12)-(14), (A.6) and Itoˆ’s formula,
0 =
N∑
i=1
E
[
e−ρT x˜Ti (T )(P xˆi(T ) +Kx¯(T ) + s(T ))− x˜Ti (0)(P xˆi(0) +Kx¯(0) + s(0))
]
= E
∫ T
0
N∑
i=1
e−ρt
{
− x˜Ti
[
Qxˆi −Q(Γx¯+ η)− ΓTQ ((I − Γ)x¯− η)
]
uˆTi Ru˜i)
}
dt
+NE
∫ T
0
e−ρt(xˆ(N) − x¯)T (GTP + PG)x˜(N)dt.
From this and (A.8), we obtain
1
N
N∑
i=1
Ii = 2E
∫ T
0
e−ρt(xˆ(N) − x¯)T · (QΓ +GTP + PG)x˜(N)dt.
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By Lemma A.1, (A.4) and (A.5), we obtain
∣∣∣ 1
N
N∑
i=1
Ii
∣∣∣2 ≤ CE
∫ T
0
e−ρt‖xˆ(N) − x¯‖2dt · E
∫ T
0
e−ρt‖x˜(N)‖2dt,
which implies | 1
N
∑N
i=1 Ii| = O(1/
√
N). 
APPENDIX B
PROOFS OF LEMMA 2.2 AND THEOREM 2.4
Proof of Lemma 2.2. From (A.2), we have
xˆ(N)(t)− x¯(t) = e(A¯+G)t[xˆ(N)(0)− x¯(0)] + 1
N
N∑
i=1
∫ t
0
e(A¯+G)(t−v)σdWi(v).
Thus,
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(‖xˆ(N)(t)− x¯(t)‖2) dt
≤ 2E
∫ ∞
0
∥∥∥e(A¯+G− ρ2 I)t∥∥∥2 ∥∥xˆ(N)(0)− x¯(0)∥∥2dt
+ 2E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
1
N
∥∥∥∥
∫ t
0
e(A¯+G)(t−v)σdWi(v)
∥∥∥∥
2
dt
≤ 2
∫ ∞
0
∥∥∥e(A¯+G− ρ2 I)t∥∥∥2 E∥∥xˆ(N)(0)− x¯(0)∥∥2dt
+
2
N
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
∫ t
0
tr
[
σTσe(A¯+G+A¯
T+GT )(t−v)
]
dvdt
≤ 2
N
∫ ∞
0
∥∥∥e(A¯+G− ρ2 I)t
∥∥∥2 E∥∥ max
1≤i≤N
xˆi(0)
∥∥2dt
+
C
N
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρv‖σ‖2
∫ ∞
v
∥∥e(A¯+G¯− ρ2 I)(t−v)∥∥2dtdv
≤ O( 1
N
).

Proof of Theorem 2.4. By A1)-A4), Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2, we obtain that x¯ ∈ Cρ/2([0,∞),Rn)
and
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(∥∥xˆ(N)(t)− x¯(t)∥∥2) dt = O( 1
N
),
which further gives that
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt‖xˆ(N)(t)‖2dt <∞.
Denote g
∆
= −BR−1BT ((Π− P )x¯+ s) +Gx(N) + f . Then E ∫∞
0
e−ρt‖g(t)‖2dt <∞ and
xˆi(t) = e
A¯txˆi0 +
∫ t
0
eA¯(t−v)g(v)dv +
∫ t
0
eA¯(t−v)σdWi. (B.1)
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Note that A¯− ρ
2
I is Hurwitz. By Schwarz’s inequality,
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt‖xˆi(t)‖2dt
≤ 3E
∫ ∞
0
∥∥∥e(A¯− ρ2 I)t
∥∥∥2 ‖xˆi0‖2dt+ 3E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtt
∫ t
0
∥∥∥eA¯(t−v)g(v)∥∥∥2dvdt
+ 3E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
∫ t
0
tr[eA¯
T (t−v)σT (v)σ(v)eA¯(t−v)]dvdt
≤ C + 3E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρv‖g(v)‖2
∫ ∞
v
t
∥∥e(A¯− ρ2 I)(t−v)∥∥2dtdv
+ 3CE
∫ ∞
0
e−ρv‖σ(v)‖2
∫ ∞
v
∥∥e(A¯− ρ2 I)(t−v)∥∥2dtdv
≤ C + 3CE
∫ ∞
0
e−ρv‖g(v)‖2dv + 3CE
∫ ∞
0
e−ρv‖σ(v)‖2dv ≤ C1.
This with (19) completes the proof. 
APPENDIX C
PROOFS OF THEOREMS 2.5 AND 2.6
Proof. i)⇒ ii). By (18),
dE[xˆi]
dt
= A¯E[xˆi]− BR−1BT ((Π− P )x¯+ s) +GE[xˆ(N)] + f, E[xˆi(0)] = x¯0. (C.1)
It follows from A1) that
E[xˆi] = E[xˆj ] = E[xˆ
(N)], j 6= i.
By comparing (23) and (C.1), we obtain E[xˆi] = x¯. Note that ‖x¯‖2 =
∥∥Exˆi∥∥2 ≤ E‖xˆi‖2. It
follows from (26) that ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt‖x¯(t)‖2dt <∞. (C.2)
By (23), we have
x¯(t) =e(A+G−BR
−1BTΠ)t
[
x¯0 +
∫ t
0
e−(A+G−BR
−1BTΠ)τh(τ)dτ
]
,
where h = −BR−1BT s + f . By the arbitrariness of x¯0 with (C.2) we obtain that A + G −
BR−1BTΠ − ρ
2
I is Hurwitz. That is, (A + G − ρ
2
I, B) is stabilizable. By [2], (21) admits a
unique solution such that Π > 0. Note that E[x(N)]2 ≤ 1
N
∑N
i=1 E[xˆ
2
i ]. Then from (26) we have
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
∥∥xˆ(N)(t)∥∥2dt <∞. (C.3)
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This leads to E
∫∞
0
e−ρt‖g(t)‖2dt <∞, where g=−BR−1BT ((Π− P )x¯+ s) +Gxˆ(N) + f . By
(B.1), we obtain
E‖xˆi(t)‖2 = E
∥∥∥∥eA¯t
(
xi0 +
∫ t
0
e−A¯τg(τ)dτ
)∥∥∥∥
2
+ E
∫ t
0
tr
[
σT (τ)e(A¯
T+A¯)(t−τ)σ(τ)
]
dτ.
By (26) and the arbitrariness of xi0 we obtain that A¯ − ρ2I is Hurwitz, i.e., (A − ρ2I, B) is
stabilizable. By [2], (20) admits a unique solution such that P > 0.
From (C.2) and (C.3),
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
∥∥xˆ(N)(t)− x¯(t)∥∥2dt <∞. (C.4)
On the other hand, (A.2) gives
E
∥∥xˆ(N)(t)− x¯(t)∥∥2
= E
∥∥e(A¯+G)t[xˆ(N)(0)− x¯0]∥∥2 + 1
N
∫ t
0
tr
[
σT (τ)e(A¯
T+GT+A¯+G)(t−τ)σ(τ)
]
dτ.
By (C.4) and the arbitrariness of xi0, i = 1, · · · , N , we obtain that A¯ +G− ρ2I is Hurwitz.
(ii)⇒(iii). Define V (t) = e−ρty¯T (t)Πy¯(t), where y¯ satisfies
dy¯
dt
= (A+G)y¯ +Bu¯, y¯(0) = y¯0.
Denote V by V ∗ when u¯ = u¯∗ = −R−1BTΠy¯. By (21) we have
dV ∗
dt
= y¯T (t)
[− ρΠ+ (A+ G−BR−1BTΠ)TΠ+ Π(A +G−BR−1BTΠ)]y¯(t)
= y¯T (t)
[− Qˆ− ΠBR−1BTΠ]y¯(t) ≤ 0.
Note that V ∗ ≥ 0. Then limt→∞ V ∗(t) exists, which implies
lim
t0→∞
[V ∗(t0)− V ∗(t0 + T )] = 0. (C.5)
Rewrite Π(t) in (15) by ΠT (t). Then we have ΠT+t0(t0) = ΠT (0). By (15),∫ T+t0
t0
e−ρt(y¯T Qˆy¯ + u¯TRu¯)dt
= e−ρt0 y¯T (t0)ΠT+t0(t0)y¯(t0) +
∫ T
0
e−ρt
∥∥u¯+R−1BTΠT+t0(t0)y¯∥∥2Rdt
≥ e−ρt0∥∥y¯(t0)∥∥2ΠT+t0(t0) = e−ρt0
∥∥y¯(t0)∥∥2ΠT (0).
This with (C.5) implies
lim
t0→∞
e−ρt0
∥∥y¯(t0)∥∥2ΠT (0)
≤ lim
t0→∞
∫ T+t0
t0
e−ρt(‖y¯‖2
Qˆ
+ ‖u¯∗‖2R)dt = lim
t0→∞
[V ∗(t0)− V ∗(t0 + T )] = 0.
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By A3), one can obtain that there exists T > 0 such that ΠT (0) > 0 (See e.g. [43], [44]). Thus,
we have limt→∞ e−ρt
∥∥y¯(t)∥∥2 = 0, which (A+G− ρ
2
I, B) is stabilizable. Similarly, we can show
(A− ρ
2
I, B) is stabilizable.
(iii)⇒(i). This part has been proved in Theorem 2.4. 
Proof of Theorem 2.6. (iii)⇒(i). From [2], (20) and (21) admit unique solutions P ≥ 0,Π ≥ 0
such that A−BR−1BTP− ρ
2
I and A−BR−1BTΠ− ρ
2
I are Hurwitz, respectively. Thus, there ex-
ists a unique s(0) such that s ∈ Cρ/2([0,∞),Rn). It is straightforward that x¯ ∈ Cρ/2([0,∞),Rn).
By the argument in the proof of Theorem 2.4, (i) follows.
(i)⇒(ii). The proof of this part is similar to that of (i)⇒(ii) in Theorem 2.5.
(ii)⇒(iii). Since Π ≥ 0, then there exists an orthogonal U such that
UTΠU =

 0 0
0 Π2

 ,
where Π2 > 0. From (20),
ρUTΠU =(UT A¯U)TUTΠU + UTΠUUT A¯U + UT Q¯U, (C.6)
where A¯
∆
= A +G−ΠBR−1BTΠ, Q¯ = Qˆ+ΠBR−1BTΠ. Denote
UT A¯U =

 A¯11 A¯12
A¯21 A¯22

 , UT Q¯U =

 Q¯11 Q¯12
Q¯21 Q¯22

 .
By pre- and post-multiplying by ξT and ξ where ξ = [ξT1 , 0]
T , it follows that
0 = ρξTUTΠUξ = ξTUT Q¯Uξ.
From the arbitrariness of ξ1, we obtain Q¯11 = 0. Since Q¯ is semi-positive definite, then Q¯12 =
Q¯21 = 0, and Q¯22 ≥ 0. By comparing each block matrix of both sides of (C.6), we obtain
A¯21 = 0. It follows from (C.6) that
ρΠ2 = Π2A¯22 + A¯
T
22Π2 + Q¯22. (C.7)
Let ζ = [ζT1 , ζ
T
2 ]
T = UT y¯∗, where y¯∗ satisfies ˙¯y∗ = A¯y¯∗. Then we have
ζ˙1 = A¯11ζ1 + A¯12ζ2,
ζ˙2 = A¯22ζ2.
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By Lemma 4.1 of [38], the detectability of (A+G, Qˆ1/2) implies the detectability of (A¯, Q¯1/2).
Take ζ(0) = ξ = [ξT1 , 0]
T . Then Q¯1/2y¯ = Q¯1/2Uζ = 0, which together with the detectability of
(A¯, Q¯1/2) implies ζ1 → 0 and A¯11 is Hurwitz. Denote S(t) = e−ρtζT2 Π2ζ2. By (C.7),
S(T )− S(0) = −
∫ T
0
ζ2(t)
T Q¯22ζ2(t)dt ≤ 0,
which implies limt→∞ S(t) exists. By a similar argument with the proof of Theorem 2.5, we
obtain limt0→∞ e
−ρt0
∥∥ζ2(t0)∥∥2Π2,T (0) = 0 and Π2,T (0) > 0, which gives ζ2 → 0 and A¯22 is
Hurwitz. This with the fact that A¯11 is Hurwitz gives that ζ is stable, which leads to (iii). 
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREMS 3.2 AND 3.3
Proof of Theorem 3.2. From (44) and (45), we have
d(xˆ(N) − x¯) = (A¯+G)(xˆ(N) − x¯)dt+ σ
N
N∑
i=1
dWi,
where A¯ = A−BR−1BTP . This implies that
sup
0≤t≤T
E‖xˆ(N)(t)− x¯(t)‖2 = O( 1
N
). (D.1)
By Schwarz’s inequality,
JFi (uˆi, uˆ−i) ≤ J¯Fi (uˆi) + E
∫ T
0
e−ρt‖xˆ(N)(t)− x¯(t)‖2dt
+ 2C
(
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt‖xˆ(N)(t)− x¯(t)‖2dt
)1/2
≤ J¯Fi (uˆi) +O(1/
√
N). (D.2)
To prove (46), it suffices to only consider ui ∈ L2Ft(0, T ;Rr) such that JFi (ui, uˆ−i) ≤
JFi (uˆi, uˆ−i) <∞. By (3),
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt‖ui‖2dt <∞. (D.3)
After the set of strategies (ui, uˆ−i) is applied, the corresponding dynamics of N agents can be
written as
dxi =(Axi +Bui +Gx
(N) + f)dt+ σdWi,
dxj =(Axj +Buˆj +Gx
(N) + f)dt+ σdWj, j = 1, · · · , i− 1, i+ 1, · · · , N.
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This with (39) implies
d(x(N) − x¯)
= [(A+G)(x(N) − x¯) + 1
N
B(ui − uˆi) +B(uˆ(N) +R−1BT p¯)]dt+ 1
N
N∑
j=1
σdWj
= [(A+G)(x(N) − x¯) + 1
N
B(ui − uˆi)− BR−1BTP (xˆ(N) − x¯)]dt+ σ
N
N∑
j=1
dWj.
By (D.1), (D.3) and elementary SDE estimates, one can obtain
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt‖x(N) − x¯‖2dt < O( 1
N
). (D.4)
We have
d(xi − x`i) = [A(xi − x`i) +G(x(N) − x¯)]dt,
which together with (D.4) gives that
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt‖xi − x`i‖2dt < O( 1
N
). (D.5)
Note that
‖xi − (Γx(N) + η)‖2Q ≥ ‖x`i − (Γx¯+ η)‖2Q + 2[x`i − (Γx¯+ η)]TQ[(xi − x`i) + Γ(x¯− x(N))],
and J¯Fi (ui) <∞. By Schwarz’s inequality, (D.4) and (D.5), we obtain
JFi (ui, uˆ−i)
≥ J¯Fi (ui)−
[
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt‖x`i − (Γx¯+ η)‖2Qdt
]1/2
·
[
E
∫ T
0
e−ρt‖(xi − x`i) + Γ(x¯− x(N)‖2Qdt
]1/2
≥ J¯Fi (ui)− O(1/
√
N).
From this and (D.2), the theorem follows. 
Proof of Theorem 3.3. Note that {xˆi(t), i = 1, · · · , N} are mutually independent processes
with the expectation x¯(t). By Lemma 3.2,
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt‖xˆi(t)− x¯(t)‖2dt ≤ 1
N
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt‖xˆi(t)‖2dt = O( 1
N
).
We only need to show E
∫∞
0
e−ρt‖xi‖2Qdt ≤ C for all ui satisfying
Ji(ui, uˆ−i) ≤ Ji(uˆi, uˆ−i) ≤ C0. (D.6)
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From (D.6), we obtain
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
∥∥xi − 1
N
xi
∥∥2
Q
dt
≤ E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
∥∥xi − 1
N
xi − 1
N
∑
j 6=i
xˆj
∥∥2
Q
dt+ E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
∥∥ 1
N
∑
j 6=i
xˆj
∥∥2
Q
dt
≤ C0 + E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
∥∥xˆj∥∥2Qdt ≤ C,
which with Lemma 3.2 implies
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt‖xi‖2Qdt ≤ C1,
where C1 is independent of N . The rest of the proof follows by that of Theorem 3.2. 
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